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Neutrality Fatality as Between Government Speech
and Religion and Nonreligion: How the Government
Speech Doctrine Provides a Solution
I. INTRODUCTION

The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment protects the
right to speak for all individuals and entities, including the
government, but the Establishment Clause requires the government
to maintain neutrality regarding religious speech and action. 1 So
what happens when these two constitutional rights collide? This
Comment argues that because the Establishment Clause mandates
neutrality only between religions and not as between religion and
nonreligion (absolute neutrality), the government should be able to
speak and endorse religion in general under the government speech
doctrine.
One might argue that this is not a common collision because the
Establishment Clause applies only to government. But this conflict
arises whenever the government adopts as its own any religious
speech. 2 Under the relatively new government speech doctrine, the
government has the constitutional power to "speak for itself." 3 In
other words, just as every U.S. citizen is entitled to speak freely, the
U.S. government is entitled to have and express its own opinions. Of
course, this doctrine is subject to some limitations, notably the
Establishment Clause. 4

I. The Court has certainly not applied a bright-line test to Establishment Clause cases,
see infra Part II.B, but the scope of this Comment is limited to the baseline requirement of
governmental neutrality. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 839 (2000) (citations omitted)
("As I have previously explained, neutrality is important, but it is by no means the only 'axiom
in the history and precedent of the Establishment Clause."'); see also Christopher C. Lund,
Legislative Prayer and the Secret Costs of Religious Endorsements, 94 MINN. L. REV. 972, 973 (20 10)
("The Establishment Clause cannot be reduced to a single principle. But if it could-if there is a
single premise that has animated the Supreme Court's approach over the past fifty years-it
would be the neutrality principle.").
2. See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009); Van Orden v.
Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
3. Bd. of Regents ofUniv. ofWis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217,229 (2000).
4. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors ofUniv. ofVa., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (differentiating
private religious speech, which is protected under the Free Exercise clause, from government speech
endorsing religion, which is prohibited under the Establishment clause); see also Summum, 555 U.S. 460.
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The Court has been unclear about how it would handle a
collision between the government speech doctrine and
Establishment Clause neutrality. Even in cases that appear to have
implicated both, the Court has not addressed the potential conflict. 5
While scholars have discussed government speech and viewpoint
neutrality in general, 6 the legal literature has likewise sidestepped
the more narrow discussion of how the government speech doctrine
can provide a solution to the neutrality mandate. Scholars who
discuss the government speech doctrine merely mention the
Establishment Clause in passing, but they do not explore whether or
how the clause limits government speech. 7 Similarly, articles that
focus on Establishment Clause neutrality note the government
speech cases, but skirt the central issue of how the two concepts
relate. 8 The few articles that do discuss the interplay between the

5. C.f Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (ruling that the government has a right to
place conditions that discourage abortion on grants of government stipends without mentioning
the fact that abortion can be considered a general religious topic); see also Summum, 555 U.S. at
467 (holding a Ten Commandments monument placed in a public park to be government speech
without even addressing the potential Establishment Clause issues typically associated with Ten
Commandments displays).
6. See joseph Blocher, Viewpoint Neutrality and Government Speech, 52 B.C. L. REV. 695
(2011) (arguing that "[g]overnment speech creates a paradox at the heart of the First
Amendment").
7. See, e.g., Nelda H. Cambron-McCabe, When Government Speaks: An Examination of the
Evolving Government Speech Doctrine, 274 EDUC. L. REP. 753, 753 n. 4 (2012) (expressly focusing
on government speech and not its relation to the Establishment Clause); Mary Jean Dolan,
Government Identity Speech and Religion: Establishment Clause Limits After Summum, 19 WM. & MARY
BILLRTS.j. 1, 8 (2010).
8. See, Christopher A. Boyko, A New Originalism: Adoption ofa Grammatical Interpretive Approach to
Establishment Clause jurisprudence After District of Columbia v. Heller, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 703, 765
(2009) (discussing "religion in general" among the myriad of approaches the Court takes in
Establishment Clause cases, without discussing how this fits within the government speech doctrine);
Mary Jean Dolan, The Cross National Memorial: At the Intersection of Speech and Religion, 61 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 1171 (2011); David E. Fitzkee & Linell A. Letendre, Religion in the Military: Navigating the Channel
Between the Religion Clauses, 59 A.F. L. REV. 1, 30 n. 225 (2007) (focusing on the Establishment Clause's
application in the military and mentioning the government speech doctrine in a footnote); Bruce
Ledewitz, Toward A Meaning-Full Establishment Clause Neutrality, 87 CHL-KENT L. REV. 725, 733 (2012)
(making the opposite argument by stating "that government must be neutral with respect to religion
in general and monotheism in particular [because this] is the best interpretation of the Establishment
Clause"); William R. Marty, To Favor Neither Religion Nor Nonreligion: Schools in a Pluralist Society,
in EQUAL SEPARATION: UNDERSTANDING THE RELIGION CLAUSES OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 95, 99 (Paul
J. Weber ed., 1990) (merely discussing different approaches the government has taken regarding
religious principles in public schools, without discussing government speech doctrine); Eric Jeppsen,
Note, Uneven "Neutrality": Dual Standards and the Establishment Clause in johnson v. Poway, 2012 BYU L.
REV. 543 (mentioning the government speech doctrine only to explain an argument in one
Establishment Clause case).
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government speech doctrine and the Establishment Clause have
either maintained a much narrower focus (e.g., by focusing on how
the doctrines affect public schools), 9 or explored the two doctrines
to illustrate a separate and distinct argument regarding their
relationship. 10
This Comment first proposes that Establishment Clause
neutrality should not apply to governmental endorsements of religion
in general, meaning it does not mandate absolute neutrality. This
approach would be almost impossible for the government to
maintain for various reasons explained below, 11 and the government
should be held to a more manageable standard, which would require
it not to prefer specific religious sects over one another. Where a
governmental message endorses belief generally but not a particular
religion, the Establishment Clause is not violated.

9. Martha McCarthy, When Government Expression Collides with the Establishment Clause, 10
BYU Eouc. & L.j. 113 (2010).
10. Dolan, supra note 7, at 8 (mentioning both doctrines to maintain a different sideargument that government speech "with arguably religious themes should be prohibited, unless
the government can show that any religious content is negligible compared to a clear secular
meaning"); Scott W. Gaylord, Licensing Facially Religious Government Speech: Summum's Impact on
the Free Speech and Establishment Clauses, 8 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 315, 322 (2010) [hereinafter
Licensing Facially Religious Government Speech] (exploring the effect of recent government speech
cases on the Establishment Clause and arguing that "the central Establishment Clause inquiry
with respect to facially religious government speech is whether the government has a primarily
religious purpose"-maintaining a focus on specialty license plate laws); Scott W. Gaylord, When
the Exception Becomes the Rule: Marsh and Sectarian Legislative Prayer Post-Summum, 79 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1017, 1019 (20ll) [hereinafter When the Exception Becomes the Rule] (explaining how the
government speech doctrine affects the constitutional exception of sectarian legislative prayer);
james J. Knicely & john W. Whitehead, In God We Trust: The judicial Establishment of American Civil
Religion, 43 ]. MARSHALL L. REV. 869, 875 (2010) ("[G]reater scrutiny is needed for application of
the government speech doctrine in order to avoid the diminution of precious First Amendment
liberties while at the same time arguing that the judiciary should permit individually expressed
sectarian sentiments at public events in the interests of accommodation, tolerance and religious
diversity, and as a means of avoiding the establishment of a monopolistic American Civil
Religion."); L. Darnell Weeden, A First Amendment Establishment Clause Analysis of Permanent
Displays on Public Property As Government Speech, 35 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 217, 219, 238 (2010)
(focuses on "[g]overnment speech consisting of permanent religious monuments residing in
public" places and argues that these should not violate the Establishment Clause "when they
possess historical significance"). But see Bruce Ledewitz, Could Government Speech Endorsing a
Higher Law Resolve the Establishment Clause Crisis?, 41 ST. MARY'S L.j. 41, 92 (2009) (taking a
similar stance that the government speech doctrine may resolve the Establishment Clause crisis
by permitting the government to publicly endorse a higher law). Of these scholarly works, the
Ledewitz article comes the closest to my argument. But while Ledewitz reaches the same
conclusion, he does so with exclusive use of the government speech doctrine, which forms only
half of my analysis-the other half concerning the neutrality distinction between (1) religion and
religion and (2) religion and nonreligion.
11. See infra Part II. C.
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The Court has interpreted the Establishment Clause to prohibit
the government's favoring any particular religion over others, which
is largely undisputed. 12 But the Court has also stated that favoring
religion over nonreligion is prohibited, 13 an assertion which is less
certain. Although the Court has frequently repeated this apparent
rule of neutrality between "religion and nonreligion," 14 it has never
actually applied it in a real case, 15 which makes the repetition of this
phrase seem hollow. Therefore, this Comment concludes that while
the government cannot show preference for one religion over
another, the purported requirement of absolute neutrality is not part
of Establishment Clause doctrine.
If the purported requirement of absolute neutrality does not
exist and the Establishment Clause does not actually prohibit the
government from endorsing religion in general, it follows that the
government may take a stance on general moral and religious

12. This first part of the principle is undisputed because it is obvious that the government
cannot praise Hinduism over Catholicism or vice versa. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97
(1968) (determining that state statutes forbidding the teaching of evolution in public schools
were contrary to the freedom of religion mandate in the First Amendment because they showed
a governmental preference for the Biblical account of Creationism to the scientific, evolution
theory).
13. McCreary Cnty., Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) (quoting Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)); see U.S. CONST. amend. I.
14. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 698 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring)
("[G]overnment must . . . 'effect no favoritism among sects or between religion and
nonreligion."' (citations omitted)); McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 860 (quoting Epperson, 393 U.S. at
104); Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburg Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 605 (1989) ("[W]e have
held it to mean no official preference even for religion over nonreligion. ").
15. See McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 860 (stating the principle of neutrality between
religion and nonreligion, but seemingly bases its holding on the first Epperson principle regarding
neutrality between religion and religion); Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Viii. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet,
512 U.S. 687, 705 (1994) (holding that because "the benefit [of an exemption] flows only to a
single sect," Satmar Hasidim (a strict form of]udaism), distinguishing this sole school district
violated the Establishment Clause-also stating that "aiding this single, small religious group
causes no less a constitutional problem than would follow from aiding a sect with more
members or religion as a whole," but this statement is mere dicta because it is not necessary to
the holding); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 597 (1992) (concluding that a particular religious
exercise, "nonsectarian" ceremonial prayer, conducted at a graduation ceremony is
unconstitutional because it exhibited preferential treatment of a "Judea-Christian tradition" at
the expense of students retaining differing beliefs); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982)
(exclusively citing the first Epperson principle of neutrality between religion and religion in
saying that "[t]he government must be neutral when it comes to competition between sects"
(quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952))); Epperson, 393 U.S. at 104 (stating the
principle that governmental neutrality is mandated between religion and nonreligion without
either explaining what this means or including this principle in its holding).
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principles under the government speech doctrine-another argument
mentioned by several works in different contexts but not yet fully
developed. 16 Thus, the government speech doctrine allows the
government to speak out on one side of moral questions and
controversies without violating the neutrality requirements of the
Establishment Clause, so long as the principles it endorses are not
specific to any particular religion.
Part II provides an outline of both the government speech
doctrine and Establishment Clause neutrality, and discusses why the
Court's apparent absolute neutrality mandate is problematicY Part
III argues that this oft-quoted neutrality mandate between religion
and nonreligion is actually only repeated dictum that is not a
doctrinal requirement. 18 Accordingly, Part IV contends that under
the government speech doctrine, the government may properly take
a stance on religion in general and nonsectarian, moral, and religious
principles without violating the Establishment Clause. 19 Part V
concludes. 20
II. GOVERNMENT SPEECH AND ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE NEUTRALITY:
THE INEVITABLE CONFLICT

To communicate the tension between Establishment Clause
neutrality and the government speech doctrine, this Part first
provides a brief background discussion of both topics. It then
describes the problem created by the supposed absolute neutrality
mandate: the neutrality mandate is virtually impossible to
implement.

A. Description of the Government Speech Doctrine
The government speech doctrine is a relatively new principle 21
that has its roots in a common sense idea: that the government has a
right to take a stance on matters relevant to law and policy. In Rust v.
Sullivan, for example, the Court stated that "[t]he Government can,

16. See supra note 8.
17. See infra Part II.
18. See infra Part III.
19. See infra Part IV.
20. See infra Part V.
21. Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 481 (2009) (Stevens, ].,
dissenting) (describing the government speech doctrine as "recently minted").
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without violating the Constitution, selectively fund a program to
encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public interest,
without at the same time funding an alternative program which
seeks to deal with the problem in another way." 22 From its small
beginning in Rust, the government speech doctrine has developed
into a much broader principle. 23
While the First Amendment restricts governmental regulation of
private speech, "it does not regulate government speech." 24 The
government, as an independent entity, has just as much right to
"speak for itself' 25 as a U.S. citizen under the First Amendmentsubject to the Establishment Clause and other constitutional
restrictions. 26
The U.S. Supreme Court has attempted to draw a clear line
distinguishing ~overnment speech from government endorsement of
private speech, 7 but this line can be difficult to discern. 28 Because

22. 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991). In Rust, the Court determined that "the government may
'make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and . . . implement that judgment
by the allocation of public funds."' Id. at 192-93 (citations omitted). The Court thereby
introduced the government speech doctrine by recognizing that "[t]here is a basic difference
between direct state interference with a protected activity and state encouragement of an
alternative activity consonant with legislative policy." Id. at 193 (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
23. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 566-67 (2005) (holding that the
government's speech is exempt from First Amendment scrutiny); Bd. of Regents of Univ. of
Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229 (2000) (holding that the government has the right to
"speak for itself"); Nat'! Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 598 (1998) (Scalia,].,
concurring) ("It is the very business of government to favor and disfavor points of view.");
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. ofVa., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995) ("[The Government]
is entitled to say what it wishes."); Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'! Comm., 412
U.S. 94, 109 n.7, 139 (1973) (Stewart,]., concurring) ("Government is not restrained by the
First Amendment from controlling its own expression.").
24. Summum, 555 U.S. at 467.
25. Southworth, 529 U.S. at 229.
26. See Finley, 524 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, ]., concurring) ("It is the very business of
government to favor and disfavor points of view."); Children First Found., Inc. v. Martinez, 631
F. Supp. 2d 159, 172 (N.D.N.Y. 2007) ("As a general rule, government has the undeniable right
to speak for itself and to advocate and defend its own policies subject only to the review of the
electoral and political processes . . . . This liberty to chose [sic] its message sanctions a
government's viewpoint based restriction.").
27. Johanns, 544 U.S. at 559 (endorsing the principle that "[c]ompelled support of a
private association is fundamentally different from compelled support of government" (quoting
Abood v. Detroit Bd. ofEduc., 431 U.S. 209,259 n. 13 (1977) (Powell,]., concurring)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
28. See Lund, supra note 1, at 1016 ("The line between governmental speech and private
speech is often thin and hard to discern."); e.g., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm'r of
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"some government a~encies involve, or entirely consist of,
advocating a position," 2 such as the FDA 30 or the EPA, 31 the power
of the government speech doctrine is vital to many central functions
of the government, and so long as the government is not endorsing
private speech, its speech can be classified as "government speech,"
which means that it is not subject to First Amendment limitations
on government. 32
The Supreme Court has stated that government speech occurs
when "the government sets the overall message to be communicated
and approves every word that is disseminated." 33 Thus, for speech to
qualify as government speech and be exempt from First Amendment
scrutiny, the message must be "effectively controlled by the Federal
Government itself." 34 This means that the "government exclusively
crafts and controls its own speech, from 'beginning to end."' 35 The
Court held that the government had shown this level of control over
the speech involved in Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Association. 36 In
Johanns, Congress directed and coordinated a program to promote
beef products. 37 Even though the government outsourced some of
this promotional work to outside, independent organizations, "the
Secretary exercise[d] final approval authority over every word used

the Va. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 305 F.3d 241, 251 (4th Cir. 2002) (Gregory,]., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en bane) ("What is, and what is not, 'government speech' is a nebulous
concept, to say the least."); Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech is Both Private and
Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 612 (2008) ("While the existence of the government
speech doctrine is now firmly established, its contours are not."); id. at 607 ("The trouble with
this dichotomy is that not all speech is purely private or purely governmental. In fact, much
speech is the joint production of both government and private speakers and exists somewhere
along a continuum, with pure private speech and pure government speech at each end.").
29. Johanns, 544 U.S. at 559.
30. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov (last visited Oct. 30, 2012) (stating
as its front-page, mission statement: "Protecting and Promoting Your Health").
31. U.S. Et-:VTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://blog.epa.gov/administrator/ (last visited
Oct. 30, 2012) (quoting EPA Administrator, Usa P. Jackson, stating: "(W]e can preserve our
climate, protect our health and strengthen our economy all at the same time.").
32. Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009) ("The Free Speech
Clause restricts government regulation of private speech; it does not regulate government
speech.").
33. Johanns, 544 U.S. at 562.
34. Id. at 560.
35. Children First Found., lnc. v. Martinez, 631 F. Supp. 2d 159, 172 (N.D.N.Y. 2007)
(quoting Johanns, 544 U.S. at 560).
36. Johanns, 544 U.S. at 562.
37. Id. at 561.
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in every promotional campaign," and Department officials reviewed
"[a]ll proposed promotional messages . . . both for substance and
for wording." 38 Thus, a key element of the government speech
doctrine is the "degree of governmental control over the message." 39
Conversely, "when the government is not trying to send a
message of its own, but is instead trying to create a place for
individuals to speak, the resulting speech is considered private." 40
Speech cannot be government speech when the government is
merely providing a forum for private speakers. For example, in
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia, the Court
dealt with a situation where a public university denied school
funding to a particular student publication based on that
publication's religious character. 41 "The Court explained that this
publication was not government speech because the university was
not 'speak[ing] or subsidiz[ing] transmittal of a message it
favors."142
While there have been several cases affirming the existence of
the government speech doctrine in recent years, the most recent
being Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 43 some academics and
judges are still skeptical of its application. 44 In Summum, the Court
held that the government's decision to "accept certain privately
donated monuments while rejecting [Summum's] is best viewed as a
form of government sfeech," which meant it was "not subject to the
Free Speech Clause." 4

38. Id.
39. See id.
40. Lund, supra note 1, at 1016 (citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of
Va., 515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995)).
41. 515 u.s. 819, 822-23 (1995).
42. Lund, supra note I, at 1016 (citing Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834); see also Capitol
Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 770 (1995) (affirming the grant of an
injunction to the Ku Klux Klan to display a white cross in the capitol square because the speech
was "purely private" and it occurred in a "designated public forum, publicly announced and open
to all on equal terms").
43. 555 U.S. 460 (2009).
44. Id. at 481 (Stevens, ]., concurring) ("To date, our decisions relying on the recently
minted government speech doctrine to uphold government action have been few and, in my
view, of doubtful merit."); Steven H. Goldberg, The Government-Speech Doctrine: "Recently Minted;"
but Counterfeit, 49 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 21, 23 (2010) (arguing that the Court's "newly minted
government-speech doctrine is counterfeit" and that it has great potential to "further debase
First Amendment jurisprudence").
45. Summum, 555 U.S. at 481.
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The fact that the Free Speech Clause does not restrict
government ~eech does not mean that the doctrine is completely
unrestrained. 6 For instance, "a government entity is ultimately
'accountable to the electorate and the political process for its
advocacy."' 47 In fact, the political process is the strongest and most
far-reaching check on government speech. 48 More to the point, while
government speech is not limited by the Free Speech Clause (a
clause that protects people's speech from being infringed but in no
way hinders the government's own speech), it is still constitutionally
limited by the Establishment Clause (a clause created to limit
governmental action and endorsement) .49
The First Amendment mandates, at a minimum, government
neutrality. 50 When the government acts to advance sectarian
religions, "it violates that central Establishment Clause value of
official religious neutrality," because neutrality ceases to exist when
the government takes sides, whether it is acting overtly or
clandestinely _51
To be clear, the Establishment Clause does not wholly preclude
the government from "referencing religion." 52 The Court has stated
that the First Amendment requires "governmental neutrality
between relifion and religion, and between religion and
nonreligion." 5 But in actuality, the Establishment Clause in practice
seems only to mandate neutrality among religions, which would not

46. Id. at 468.
47. Id. (quoting Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235
(2000)).
48. Children First Found., Inc. v. Martinez, 631 F. Supp. 2d 159, 172 (N.D.N.Y. 2007)
("As a general rule, government has the undeniable right to speak for itself and to advocate and
defend its own policies subject only to the review of the electoral and political processes.").
49. Summum, 555 U.S. at 468 ("The involvement of public officials in advocacy may be
limited by law, regulation, or practice.").
50. See infra Part II.B.
51. McCreary Cnty., Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005); see also Martinez, 631
F. Supp. 2d at 181 (holding that a nonprofit organization's "Choose Life" motto, which it
desired to place on New York license plates, implicated a religious message, so it was subject to
the Establishment Clause neutrality defense).
52. johnson v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d 954, 971 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied,
132 S. Ct. 1807 (2012); see also Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42 (1980) (per curiam) ("(T]he
Bible may constitutionally be used in an appropriate study of history, civilization, ethics,
comparative religion, or the like.").
53. McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 860 (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104
(1968)).
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prohibit the government from speaking about religion in general or
nonsectarian religious morals and principles.
B. Establishment Clause Neutrality: Religion v. Nonreligion

What does the Establishment Clause mandate? 54 The First
Amendment's prohibition on religious establishment "covers a
variety of issues from prayer in widely varying government settings,
to financial aid for religious individuals and institutions, to
[governmental] comment on religious questions." 55 Despite this
wide breadth of application, Establishment Clause jurisprudence
remains unclear because the Court continues to use several different
approaches instead of implementing a single, bright-line rule. 56
This Comment focuses on the baseline neutrality requirement
that "the government may not favor one religion over another, or

54. Some scholars take the majority viewpoint undermining the Religion Clauses and
argue that these clauses exist to protect nonreligion just as vigorously as religions. See, e.g.,
KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW 518-19 (4th ed. 2010);
Elizabeth A. Murphy, Note, Courts Mistakenly Cross-Out Memorials: Why the Establishment Clause Is
Not Violated by Roadside Crosses, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 723, 727 (2011) ("[T]he establishment clause
[sic] existed to create a secular state and that under the First Amendment nonreligion was just
as important as religion." (quoting PATRICK M. GARRY, WRESTLING WITH GOD: THE COURTS'
TORTUOUS TREATMENT OF RELIGION 52 (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Conversely,
some take a minority view of the Religion Clauses, labeled non-preferentialism, and maintain
that the Establishment Clause is meant only to prohibit a national religion and that the
"government might support religion in general so long as it does not prefer one religion over
another." !d. at 519-20.
55. McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 875.
56. See Ledewitz, supra note 10, at 45 ("In over a half century since Everson first
introduced the norms of government neutrality and separation from religion, there is still no
broad consensus among the American people concerning the proper role of religion in the public
square. Nor is there basic agreement among the Justices on the United States Supreme Court as
to this matter."). Some of the main Establishment Clause theories that the Court has used in
various circumstances include the "purpose test" (also known as the Lemon test), the
"Endorsement I Disapproval test," and the general "neutrality test"-which provides the focus
of this Comment's Establishment Clause analysis. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13
(1971) (outlining the "purpose test" by stating: "First, the statute must have a secular legislative
purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion[;] finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with
religion"' (citations omitted)); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (O'Connor, ].,
concurring) (illustrating Justice O'Connor's "Endorsement I Disapproval test," which was
intended to ensure that the government does not endorse any religious practice that would make
"nonadherents [feel] that they are outsiders" or less than "full members of the political
community"); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1193 (3d ed.
2006) (explaining that the neutrality test precludes the government from "favor[ing] religion
over secularism or one religion over others").
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religion over [non]religion," 57 but even this neutrality mandate is
not clear. 58
Since Everson v. Board of Education in 194 7, 59 the Court purports
to have consistently enforced the baseline neutrality rule between
religious sects as well as religion and nonreligion. 60 The first
principle is certainly true; the government cannot favor one
religious sect over another (e.g., endorsing Baptists with a tax
exemption but not Methodists), nor can the government show a
preference for a specific religion at the expense of others (e.g.,
creating a law against animal sacrifices targeting a minority
religion, while exempting a Judea-Christian religion 61 ). 62 Despite
the frequent repetition of the second principle, that the First
Amendment mandates absolute neutrality, 63 the Court has yet to
apply this portion of the neutrality mandate. 64 Part III identifies

57. McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 875-76.
58. See id. at 876 (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 422 (1963) (Harlan, ].,
dissenting) ("The constitutional obligation of 'neutrality' . . . is not so narrow a channel that
the slightest deviation from an absolutely straight course leads to condemnation.")).
59. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
60. Id. at 18 ("[The First] Amendment requires the state to be a neutral in its relations
with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be their
adversary. State power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor
them."). While the Court stated these principles in this case, the major holding concerned the
Free Exercise Clause, not the Establishment Clause. Id. at 15-16.
61. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 536 (1993).
62. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1968) (determining that state
statutes forbidding the teaching of evolution in public schools were contrary to the freedom of
religion mandate in the First Amendment because they showed a governmental preference for
the Biblical account of Creationism to the scientific, evolution theory).
63. See, e.g., McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 860 (quoting Epperson, 393 U.S. at 104); Cnty. of
Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 605 (1989) ("[W]e have held it to
mean no official preference even for religion over nonreligion."); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S.
677, 698 (2005) (Breyer,]., concurring) ("[G]overnment must . . . 'effect no favoritism among
sects or between religion and nonreligion."' (citations omitted)).
64. See Epperson, 393 U.S. at 104 (stating the principle that governmental neutrality is
mandated between religion and nonreligion without either explaining what this means or
including this principle in its holding); McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 860 (stating the principle of
neutrality between religion and nonreligion, but seeming to base its holding on the first Epperson
principle regarding neutrality between religion and religion); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 597
(1992) (concluding that a particular religious exercise, "nonsectarian" ceremonial prayer,
conducted at a graduation ceremony is unconstitutional because it exhibited preferential
treatment of a "Judea-Christian tradition" at the expense of students retaining differing beliefs);
Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982) (citing exclusively the first Epperson principle of
neutrality between religion and religion in saying that "[t]he government must be neutral when
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cases that used similar neutrality language and shows the lack of its
application. 65
C. The Impossible Mandate of Neutrality Between Religion and Nonreligion

A neutrality mandate as between religion and nonreligion would
arguably be an impossible task for the Court to enforce in the
government speech context. For instance, in Pleasant Grove City, Utah
v. Summum, the Supreme Court considered whether the government
was bound to accept the donation of a religious monument
"contain[ing] 'the Seven Aphorisms of SUMMUM,"' a minority
religion, after accepting a Ten Commandments monument donated
by a charitable organization-the Fraternal Order of Eagles-in
1971. 66 In a unanimous ruling, the Court held that "[p]ermanent
monuments displayed on public property typically represent
government speech." 67 Thus, the government is within its rights to
be selective about the monuments it chooses to accept and display. 68
This case involved a monument depicting the Ten
Commandments, yet, for strategic litigation purposes, the
Establishment Clause was not at issue because it was not raised and
preserved in the trial court. 69 But had it been preserved, would the
Court have struck down the Ten Commandments monument
because it violated the Establishment Clause, as it has done in cases
where the Ten Commandments are independently and publicly
displayed? 70 Possibly, but in cases like Summum, it is not practically
possible for the Court to take such drastic steps.7 1

it comes to competition between sects" (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952))).
65. See infra Part III.
66. 555 U.S. 460, 465 (2009) (citations omitted).
67. !d. at 470.
68. Id. at 471-72.
69. Brief for Respondent at 11, Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460
(2009) (No. 07-665), 2008 WL 3851624, at *11.
70. See, e.g., McCreary Cnty., Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860 (holding that a
display of the Ten Commandments violated the First Amendment because the County
manifested its intent, through this monument, to emphasize the judea-Christian religious
message of the Ten Commandments). But see Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681 (2005)
(holding that a Ten Commandments display did not violate the First Amendment because it
represented only a historical and traditional display, with no religious meaning).
71. Richard W. Garnett & Andrew Koppelman, Introduction: The Many Paths to Neutrality, in
FIRST AMENDMENT STORIES 5 (Richard W. Garnett & Andrew Koppelman eds., Foundation Press
2012).
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In these situations, the government is stuck between the
proverbial "rock and a hard place" as it faces the alleged mandate of
neutrality between religion and nonreligion. The government can
choose to either: (1) pretend that such symbols are not religious at
all, 72 or (2) strip government property of all religious symbols.
Neither of these routes seems acceptable-especially given America's
founding, which relied heavily on religious values and freedoms, and
the contemporary value placed on such displays by political
majorities. 73 Additionally, as a practical matter, this requirement of
neutrality between the existence of religion and the lack of religion is
at least arguably nonsensical: "it makes utterly no sense to talk
about neutrality between religion and nonreligion, or no-religion,
irreligion, or any other means of expressing the opposite of
'religion."' 74 Further, the differential treatment of religion and
nonreligion displayed in free exercise jurisprudence exemplifies the
difficulty, and perhaps even the impossibility, of affording both
identical treatment. 75
These cases that represent potential or occurring collisions of
Establishment Clause neutrality between religion and nonreligion,
and the government speech doctrine, force the Court to pretend that
this nation is not connected to religion at all or that these symbols
and words embedded in American history bear no traces to
religion-if they do, they would necessarily be deemed
unconstitutional. For example, must the cases contesting the
inclusion of the phrase "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance
result in its deletion from the Pledge? 76 Must this country's coinage

72. Frederick Mark Gedicks, Religions, Fragmentations, and Doctrinal Limits, 15 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 25, 40 ("Government may use religious symbols or forms of worship when they appear
or take place in a context that drains them of their theological content and significance.").
73. Everson v. Bd. ofEduc., 330 U.S. I (1947); Garnett & Koppelman, supra note 71.
74. Gedicks, supra note 72, at 39 (analogizing neutrality between religion and irreligion to
mandating neutrality between baseball and "not-baseball" -showing that because "not-baseball"
technically encompasses everything, a neutrality requirement would require neutrality between
baseball and everything else, which is illogical); see also Kent Greenawalt, Quo Vadis: The Status and
Prospects of "Tests" Under the Religion Clauses, 1995 Sur. CT. REV. 323, 368 ("But suppose religion
in general were inhibited. Would a law favoring atheism, agnosticism, or secularism be a law
'respecting an establishment of religion'?").
75. See Andrew Koppelman, Is it Fair to Give Religion Special Treatment?, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV.
571, 573 n.6, available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/faculty/fulltime/koppelman/religion
special. pdf.
76. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 78 n.5 (1985) (stating that "the words 'under God' in
the Pledge, as codified at 36 U.S.C. § 172, serve as an acknowledgment of religion with 'the
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bearing the words of the national motto "in God we Trust" 77 have a
meaning reduced to nothing divine? These social movements are not
likely to occur in America because " [w] e are a religious people
whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being." 78
Even if Summum had involved an Establishment Clause challenge,
the result would likely have been the same. The government speech
doctrine would still allow the government to be selective in the
monuments it chooses to display even if these monuments have
general religious context because the Establishment Clause does not
mandate an absolute neutrality between religion and nonreligion.
The government speech doctrine provides the solution to the
convoluted Establishment Clause assumptions that this kind of
neutrality is required: under the government speech doctrine, the
government can take a stance on religion in general and general
religious views, so long as the stance is not specific to any particular
religion or religious sect.
III. RELIGION IN GENERAL: NO NEUTRALITY MANDATE BETWEEN
RELIGION AND NON-RELIGION

Suppose a national crisis occurs, similar in magnitude to
September 11, 2001. Would it be unconstitutional for Congress or
the President to issue a press release that ends with a sentence like:
"No matter what you believe or what Divine authority you believe in,
pray, plead, or meditate for your country; it needs your help." Would
this be protected under the government speech doctrine, or
prohibited by the Establishment Clause? 79 This should be
understood as protected government speech because it is merely

legitimate secular purposes of solemnizing public occasions, [and] expressing confidence in the
future."' (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 693 (1984))); see also Elk Grove Unified Sch.
Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
77. McCreary Cnty., Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 854, 889 (2005).
78. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952); see also McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618,
638-39 (1978) (using the "nonreligion" language only to show that the government can still
recognize the historical connection between religion and this nation and that there is not a rigid,
no-aid requirement that prevents the government from even glancing in the direction of
religious principles).
79. See William P. Marshall, The Limits of Secularism: Public Religious Expression in Moments of
National Crisis and Tragedy, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 11, 14 (2002) (arguing that "the state [can]
endorse undeniably religious activities that affirm our Nation's religiosity without violating
constitutional prescriptions" in limited circumstances involving national emergencies, such as
9/11).
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appealing to religion in general, not to a particular religion or
religious sect. 80 Thus, the Establishment Clause should not be
interpreted as mandating absolute neutrality between religion and
nonreligion because the government's power to speak on religion in
general is rooted in the government speech doctrine.
At first, the government speech argument against this absolute
neutrality may seem like a losing battle to wage due to the Court's
oft quoted phrase that the "First Amendment mandates
governmental neutrality between . . . religion and nonreligion." 81
But in virtually all Supreme Court cases where this language is used,
it is not actually applied. 82 Furthermore, because there are many
Establishment Clause cases that have not used this or similar
neutrality language, it has been argued that the idea of acting
impartially toward all religions is inconsistently applied and that it is
not the actual state of the law. 83
This Part discusses Establishment Clause cases in which the
Court has used absolute neutrality language-such as "religion in
general" or as between "religion and nonreligion" and "belief and
non belief' -by first addressing the more common appearances of
this language in unrelated contexts or in concurring or dissenting
opinions. Then it addresses the more difficult cases, which facially

80. See Justice Scalia's similar but non-fictional example that he uses to begin his dissent.
McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 885.
81. Id. at 860 (majority opinion) (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104
(1968)).
82. See supra note 15.
83. See McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 891 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[S]ometimes the Court
chooses to decide cases on the principle that government cannot favor religion, and sometimes it
does not. . . . Suffice it to say here that when the government relieves churches from the
obligation to pay property taxes, when it allows students to absent themselves from public
school to take religious classes, and when it exempts religious organizations from generally
applicable prohibitions of religious discrimination, it surely means to bestow a benefit on
religious practice-but we have approved it."). But see Cmty. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty
v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 771 (1973) ("[I]t is now firmly established that a law may be one
'respecting an establishment of religion' even though its consequence is not to promote a 'state
religion,' and even though it does not aid one religion more than another but merely benefits all
religions alike." (citations omitted)). Although this clear statement is included in the majority
opinion in Community for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, this is not a case that shows
an invalidation for governmental speech regarding "religion in general." This case concerned tax
grants to religious, nonpublic schools. By striking these state statutes, the Court was actually
affirming its Establishment Clause jurisprudence mandating neutrality between religion and
religion-these specific religious sects were receiving benefits while other religious believers
were receiving none because they had no religious sectarian schools.
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seem to apply the absolute neutrality language but, upon closer
inspection, actually apply other justifications to reach their holdings.
Thus, these oft-repeated invocations of absolute neutrality are not
actually applied. Instead, the Court uses other Establishment Clause
justifications for its actions, not the idea of absolute neutrality with
respect to general religious principles. 84
Sometimes, the Court uses the absolute neutrality language to
illustrate different Establishment Clause concepts, 85 or it uses the
same words in completely different contexts. 86 Furthermore, there is
at least one example of a case citing the religion/nonreligion
language that has been subsequently overruled, which absolves it of
its precedential authority. 87
The greatest use of these absolute neutrality statements occurs
in dissenting or concurring opinions. 88 In Van Orden v. Perry, for

84. With most Establishment Clause cases, it seems the Court is mainly concerned with
the government favoring particular religions or religious sects over others. The Court is at least
more lenient the more general and nonsectarian the governmental practice is. See Mike Schaps,
Vagueness as a Virtue: Why the Supreme Court Decided the Ten Commandments Cases Inexactly Right, 94
CALIF. L. REV. 1243, 1244 (2006) ("One may sketch the standard as follows: Government cannot
favor one religion over another, or act to benefit religion over nonreligion, unless a government
practice promotes nonsectarian religion only slightly and is so deeply woven into our national
traditions that enjoining it would be highly divisive.").
85. E.g. Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 390 (1993)
(recognizing the district court's interpretation of the Establishment Clause in that it prohibits
"hostility to religion and advancement of nonreligion").
86. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 184 (1953) (using "belief or unbelief" language in
the majority opinion but in a completely different context-discussing criminal law, not the
Establishment Clause).
87. Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 382 (1985), overruled by Agostini v.
Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (stating that the Establishment Clause instructs "the government to
maintain a course of neutrality among religions, and between religion and nonreligion").
88. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 868, 878 (2000) (Souter, ]., dissenting)
(mentioning "nonreligion" language only in Justice Souter's dissent); City of Boerne v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507, 537 (1997) (Stevens,].. concurring) (metioning religion/irreligion language only
in justice Stevens's concurrence: "This governmental preference for religion, as opposed to
irreligion, is forbidden by the First Amendment"); Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v.
Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 798, 809 (1995) (Stevens, ]., dissenting) (using religion/irreligion
language only in Justice Stevens's dissent-"the Establishment Clause must prohibit official
sponsorship of irreligious as well as religious messages"); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 802
(1983) (Brennan, ]., dissenting) (holding that the Nebraska Legislature's chaplaincy practice
does not violate the Establishment Clause for historical/originalism reasons-mentioning
"nonreligion" language only in Justice Brennan's dissent); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 91 (1977) (Marshall,]., dissenting) (using "religion over nonreligion"
language only in Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437,
469 (1971) (Douglas, ]., dissenting) (mentioning "nonreligion" language only in Justice
Douglas's dissent); Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 694 (1970) (Harlan, ].,
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example, the Court upheld the placement of a Ten Commandments
monument that the government placed among several other
monuments for the purpose of memorializing Texas history. 89 Only
Justice Breyer's concurring opinion mentions absolute neutrality
language. 90 The use of that language seems to support the argument
that the government can speak in favor of religion generally because
immediately following its recitation, Justice Breyer emphasizes that
"the Establishment Clause does not compel the government to purge
from the public sphere all that in any way partakes of the
religious." 9 He notes that this absolutist approach is "inconsistent
with our national traditions" and that it would "tend to promote the
kind of social conflict the Establishment Clause seeks to avoid." 92
Even though most absolute neutrality language is mentioned
only by concurring and dissenting Justices, there are three cases that
must be addressed separately because they use this language and
seem to apply it in the majority opinions: County of Allegheny v. ACLU,
Lee v. Weisman, and McCreary County, Kentucky v. ACLU of Kentucky. But
while these cases may appear to apply the absolute neutrality
principle, this principle does not provide the basis for any of the
holdings, as explained in the following paragraphs. Therefore,
despite the appearance of an absolute neutrality mandate, the
government speech doctrine should apply to allow the government
to speak on religion in general.

concurring) (using "religion over nonreligion" language only in Justice Harlan's concurrence);
Bd. of Ed. of Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 249 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(using "religion and nonreligion" language only in justice Harlan's concurrence); Sch. Dist. of
Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring)
(mentioning "nonreligion" language only in Justice Goldberg's concurrence); Am. Commc'ns
Ass'n, C.I.O. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 443 (1950) Qackson, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (mentioning "belief or nonbelief" language only in the concurrence and in a context
unrelated to the neutrality analysis). But see Mark Strasser, Establishing the Pledge: On Coercion,
Endorsement, and the Marsh Wild Card, 40 IND. L. REV. 529, 577 (2007) ("Marsh may be viewed by
some as an exception to Establishment Clause jurisprudence and by others as setting a new and
very forgiving standard.").
89. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681 (2005).
90. "The Court has made clear, as Justices Goldberg and Harlan noted, that the
realization of these goals means that government must 'neither engage in nor compel religious
practices,' that it must 'effect no favoritism among sects or between religion and nonreligion,'
and that it must 'work deterrence of no religious belief.' The government must avoid excessive
interference with, or promotion of, religion." Jd. at 698-99 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citations
omitted).
91. !d. at 699.
92. Jd.
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In County of Alleghen~ v. ACLU, the Court uses "nonreligion"
language in the majority 3 and concurring opinions, 94 but absolute
neutrality played no part in the Court's final decision. The holding in
this case was based on the Establishment Clause's prohibition of
governmental preference between ~articular religions-not between
religion and nonreligion generally. 5 In fact, the absolute neutrality
language used in the majority opinion is only used to emphasize the
Establishment Clause's mandate of neutrality between various
religions. 96 Thus, the Court held that a nativity creche donated by a
Christian church and displayed in the main governmental section
violates the Establishment Clause only because it favors one set of
religious beliefs among all others. 97
Lee v. Weisman is a more difficult case because the controversy
involved "public prayers at nonsectarian civic ceremonies." 98 This case
seems to undermine the position that the Establishment Clause
prohibits only sectarian government endorsements. Indeed, the
majority opinion could be read as invalidating ceremonial

93. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 593 (1989) ("Thus, it has been noted that
the prohibition against governmental endorsement of religion 'preclude[s] government from
conveying or attempting to convey a message that religion or a particular religious belief is
favored or preferred."' (quoting Wallace v. jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985) (O'Connor, ]..
concurring in judgment))); id. at 605 ("Whatever else the Establishment Clause may mean (and
we have held it to mean no official preference even for religion over nonreligion) it certainly
means at the very least that government may not demonstrate a preference for one particular
sect or creed." (citing Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. I (1989))).
94. Jd. at 635 (O'Connor, ].. concurring) ("just as government may not favor particular
religious beliefs over others, 'government may not favor religious belief over disbelief."' (quoting
Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 27 (1989) (Blackmun, ]., concurring in judgment)));
id. at 644 (Brennan, ]., concurring) ("We have, on the contrary, interpreted that Clause to
require neutrality, not just among religions, but between religion and nonreligion.").
95. Jd. at 598 (majority opinion) ('"Glory to God in the Highest!' says the angel in the
creche~Glory to God because of the birth of jesus. This praise to God in Christian terms is
indisputably religious~indeed sectarian~just as it is when said in the Gospel or in a church
service." (emphasis added)).
96. Id. at 605.
97. Jd. at 593-94 ("The Establishment Clause, at the very least, prohibits government
from appearing to take a position on questions of religious belief or from 'making adherence to a
religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political community."'); see id. at 605
("Whatever else the Establishment Clause may mean . . . it certainly means at the very least
that government may not demonstrate a preference for one particular sect or creed (including a
preference for Christianity over other religions). 'The clearest command of the Establishment
Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another."' (citations
omitted)).
98. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 581 (1992) (emphasis added).
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preferential treatment of the "Judea-Christian tradition" at the
expense of students retaining differing beliefs. 99 The better and more
common reading of the decision, however, rests on the Captive
Audience Doctrine, 100 established under the Free Speech Clause, not
the Establishment Clause's mandate for absolute neutrality. The Court
invalidated the practice of public prayers to prevent the
impermissible coercion of participation in a religious ritual. 101
McCreary County, Kentucky v. ACLU of Kentucky is the only Supreme
Court case that seems to firmly hold that neutrality is mandated
between religion and nonreligion. However, simultaneously, this
case hints that the majority of the Court would not deem it
unconstitutional for the government to speak out on religion in
general. The Court quoted the neutrality language "between religion
and religion, and between religion and nonreligion" as the
"touchstone for [its] analysis." 102
But after examining the facts and the holding in McCreary County,
it seems that the Court actual~ based its holding on neutrality
"between religion and religion." 1 3 The Court, and the lower courts,
99. The Court only mentions "nonreligion" language in Justice Souter's concurrence. Id.
at 6!1 (Souter, J., concurring). Similar language concerning "religion in general" is only
mentioned in the majority when it is discussing the district court's reasoning-not its own. Id. at
585 (majority opinion) ("The [district] court determined that the practice of including
invocations and benedictions, even so-called nonsectarian ones, in public school graduations
creates an identification of governmental power with religious practice, endorses religion, and
violates the Establishment Clause.").
100. The captive audience doctrine was created to protect unwilling listeners who are
"there as a matter of necessity, not of choice" from having speech thrust upon their unwilling
eyes or ears. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302 (1974) (quoting Public
Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 468 (1952) (Douglas,]., dissenting)); see also Snyder v.
Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011) ("declin[ing] to expand the captive audience doctrine" to a
demonstration at a public funeral where the demonstrators were far enough away from the
mourners that they could simply avert their eyes).
101. See Cynthia V. Ward, Coercion and Choice Under the Establishment Clause, 39 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1621, 1624 (2006) ("Thus, in the 1992 case of Lee v. Weisman, the Court held that a
nondenominational prayer at a public school graduation ceremony 'coerced' religious dissenters
into participating and that such coercion violates the Establishment Clause."). But see Lee, 505
U.S. at 610 (Souter,]., concurring) (arguing that the Court has "consistently held the Clause
applicable no less to governmental acts favoring religion generally than to acts favoring one
religion over others"). To make his point, Justice Souter quotes much of the Court's language
that has been used as dicta in these cases, and while this is certainly persuasive and one of the
major Establishment Clause theories, his concurrence is not the governing reasoning in this
case, as the majority did not adopt it.
102. McCreary Cnty, Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) (quoting Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)).
103. Id.
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found that the government had shown an endorsement of
Christianity by displaying the Ten Commandments on government
property. 104 The Court did not seem to strike the display as
unconstitutional because it represented general religious principles,
but rather because the government's intent behind the display was
to endorse particular beliefs of particular religions-the belief in the
divine inspiration of the Ten Commandments. 105
Furthermore, it seems that the Court's main holding in this case
was to uphold the "purpose" test outlined in Lemon v. Kurtzman. This
implies that when the Court struck the Ten Commandments display,
it did so because of the underlying governmental endorsement of
religion. The Court was not clear as to whether the particular
endorsement in this case was struck because it favored either
religion over religion or religion over nonreligion. 106
But if McCreary County is a victory in the battle over religion and
nonreligion, there is a good argument that this case did not end the
war. 107 Citing to historic religious tributes made by the Founding
Fathers 108 and current national customs involving religion, 109 Justice
104. See id. at 869-70.
105. The court even cites to a central, historical reason for the Establishment Clause: "to
guard against the civic divisiveness that follows when the government weighs in on one side of
religious debate; nothing does a better job of roiling society, a point that needed no explanation
to the descendants of English Puritans and Cavaliers (or Massachusetts Puritans and Baptists)."
Id. at 876.
I 06. I d. at 860 (stating that it is unconstitutional to advance "religion generally" but
quoting language from an earlier case that merely prohibits the government from "acting with
the intent of promoting a particular point of view in religious matters" (quoting Corp. of the
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335
(1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
107. This is an especially valid contention given the change in Supreme Court Justices
since this case. See Christopher B. Harwood, Evaluating the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause
jurisprudence in the Wake of Van Orden v. Perry and McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 71 Mo. L.
REV. 317, 348 (2006) ("The appointment of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito to fill the
vacancies left by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor likely will alter the Court's
Establishment Clause jurisprudence and produce decisions" that will move away from the strict
neutrality approach.). Some scholars recognize this contention as a potential development, but
argue that this would be a dangerous road to go down. See Goldberg, supra note 44, at 49-50
("The great danger from [the] government-speech doctrine, allowing government to express a
private viewpoint without adopting its meaning, is that it will facilitate Justice Scalia's view of
the Establishment Clause. . . . Bad news for the one in five of our population that does not
believe in any religion and for those religionists who believe their God created humankind with
a reasoning capacity so it could take care of itself, allowing the deity to be 'unconcerned' about
.").
the vagaries of human existence
108. Justice Scalia's opinion includes several historical citations to justifY his
Establishment Clause interpretation:
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Scalia's dissent argues that nothing in the Constitution mandates
absolute neutrality. Religion, he argues, is the keystone of this
nation's foundation, 110 and while the Establishment Clause certainly
prohibits the government from endorsing or establishing particular
religions at the exclusion of others, it does not prevent the
government from speaking about religion in general. 111 General

George Washington added to the form of Presidential oath prescribed by Art. II, § 1,
cl. 8, of the Constitution, the concluding words "so help me God." The Supreme
Court under John Marshall opened its sessions with the prayer, "God save the United
States and this Honorable Court." The First Congress instituted the practice of
beginning its legislative sessions with a prayer. The same week that Congress
submitted the Establishment Clause as part of the Bill of Rights for ratification by the
States, it enacted legislation providing for paid chaplains in the House and Senate.
The day after the First Amendment was proposed, the same Congress that had
proposed it requested the President to proclaim "a day of public thanksgiving and
prayer, to be observed, by acknowledging, with grateful hearts, the many signal
favours of Almighty God." President Washington offered the first Thanksgiving
Proclamation shortly thereafter, devoting November 26, 1789, on behalf of the
American people '"to the service of that great and glorious Being who is the
beneficent author of all the good that was, that is, or that will be," thus beginning a
tradition of offering gratitude to God that continues today.
McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 886-87 (Scalia,]., dissenting) (citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
109. Justice Scalia also recognizes current practices that are both religious and
governmental:
Presidents continue to conclude the Presidential oath with the words "so help me
God." Our legislatures, state and national, continue to open their sessions with prayer
led by official chaplains. The sessions of this Court continue to open with the prayer
"God save the United States and this Honorable Court." Invocation of the Almighty
by our public figures, at all levels of government, remains commonplace. Our coinage
bears the motto, "IN GOD WE TRUST." And our Pledge of Allegiance contains the
acknowledgment that we are a Nation "under God."
Id. at 888-89.
110. "We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being." !d. at
889 (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952)).
11 I. Jd. at 885-87; see also Caroline Mala Corbin, Ceremonial Deism and the Reasonable
Religious Outsider, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1545, 1550 n.24 (2010) ("Several justices believe favoring
religion over nonreligion is compatible with the First Amendment."). But see Thomas B. Colby, A
Constitutional Hierarchy of Religions? justice Scalia, the Ten Commandments, and the Future of the
Establishment Clause, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 1097, 1099 (2006) (arguing that the government "must
be neutral in matters of religious theory, doctrine, and practice" between religion and
nonreligion (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968))). Colby presents
several hypothetical situations that he believes the traditional Establishment Clause neutrality
theory would surely invalidate: "the first promotes traditional Western religions; the second
promotes certain traditional Eastern religions; and the third promotes nonreligion." Jd.
However, these are still not examples of governmental speech centering on religion in general,
as each promotes certain religious beliefs particular to specific religions. As long as the
government is only speaking out on religion in general, this practice is constitutional.
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speech about religion, without favoring particular sects or religions
over one another, would not fuel a national division-a fear that
many Justices and scholars have expressed as justification for
implementing a strict neutrality interpretation of the Establishment
Clause. 112
Based on the use of the absolute neutrality language in primarily
concurring or dissenting opinions and the three cases that use such
language in the majority opinions but base their holdings on other
areas of law, it seems that the alleged Establishment Clause
requirement for neutrality between "religion and nonreligion" and
"belief and unbelief' is nothing more than dicta that, while
frequently cited, is never actually applied. Therefore, the government
speech doctrine should allow the government to speak about religion
in general.
IV. GOVERNMENT SPEECH ON GENERAL RELIGIOUS AND MORAL
PRINCIPLES

The government regularly speaks about subjects contammg
traces of religious belief such as abortion, gay marriage, parenting,
Sunday closing laws, alcohol consumption, drugs, and Christmas or
other religious holidays. Should the Establishment Clause require
complete government neutrality with regard to these matters? 113
Such broad neutrality is not mandated by the Establishment Clause,
and, to go one step further, the Religion Clauses actually seem
inconsistent with the idea of enforcing absolute neutrality because
they couch an inherent textual and historical bias toward religion in
general. 114 The government should have a right to "say what it
wishes" 115 to say on these general matters, and the government
speech doctrine seems to provide the authority to do so. Using the

112. Richard W. Garnett, Religion, Division, and the First Amendment, 94 GEO. L.]. 1667, 1669
(2006) ("It appears that the political-divisiveness argument is and will for some time remain at
the heart of our discussions about religious freedom and the First Amendment.").
113. One position on this question is that of course the government can endorse higher
law principles and even exercise content and viewpoint discrimination on this matter, but
"[t]here are disputes and different approaches as to what the higher law doctrine actually
encompasses." Ledewitz, supra note 8.
114. JOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? 43 (1996) ("The free exercise clause by
its terms seems inconsistent with the idea of autonomy. It seems to favor choices for religion
over choices against religion.").
115. Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009) (quoting
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors ofUniv. ofVa., 515 U.S. 819,833 (1995)).

384

363

Neutrality Fatality

doctrine to speak on religion generally would still protect
Establishment Clause neutrality, but it would not force a purely
secular public realm on the American people. 116
It is well established that the government speech doctrine is still
trumped by the Establishment Clause, but how far-reaching is this
"trump"? In other words, what does this limitation actually mean? It
means that the government cannot endorse a particular religion-not
that the government is prohibited from speaking on general moral
and religious principles. Under the government speech doctrine, the
government should be able to take a stance on moral principles that
may be religious in general without being subject to the
Establishment Clause limitation.
First, this Part discusses several Supreme Court cases that
suggest that government speech directed at religion in general can be
constitutional, so long as it does not discriminate between religions
such that it does not favor one particular religion or religious sect
over another. Second, it summarizes scholarly authority that touches
on this idea to determine what the general academic view is on the
subject and to predict what direction the Court will take when this
situation arises.
A. The Court Hints at the Constitutionality of Government Speech Regarding

Religion in General
Although the Court has not explicitly held this principle to be
true, justices on the Court have hinted on several occasions that the
government may be able to speak regarding religion in general
without violating the Establishment Clause. In fact, there are several
cases addressing Establishment Clause neutrality that suggest the
Court would allow a "non-preferentialism" approach, which would
allow the government "to prefer religion over non-religion, so long
as it is neutral among different religions and sects." 117
In some cases, the Court identifies that the central purpose of the
Establishment Clause is to ensure that history does not repeat itself.

116. See Ledewitz, supra note 8, at 42 ("The government speech doctrine would redeem
Everson's promise of neutrality without imposing a purely secular public realm on an American
people unwilling to accept that kind of public life. Government may endorse the concept of
higher law, and may do so using certain religious symbols, images, and language, without
establishing religion.").
117. Dolan, supra note 7, at 7.
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The wholesome "neutrality" of which this Court's cases speak thus
stems from a recognition of the teachings of history that powerful
sects or groups might bring about a fusion of governmental and
religious functions or a concert or dependency of one upon the
other to the end that official support of the State or Federal
Government would be placed behind the tenets of one or of all
orthodoxies. 118

This purpose of ensuring that the government is not endorsing a
particular religious belief is served by mandating governmental
neutrality between religion and religion-not by mandating
neutrality between religion and nonreligion. 119
Other Court opmwns even quote the neutrality between
"religion and nonreligion" language, but still suggest that this
supposed mandate is not a governing principle. 12 For example, in
Van Orden v. Perry, Justice Breyer's concurrence noted that "the

°

118. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
119. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962) (striking sectarian prayer at a public
school district, the Court stated, "When the power, prestige and financial support of government
is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious
minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain. But the purposes
underlying the Establishment Clause go much further than that. Its first and most immediate
purpose rested on the belief that a union of government and religion tends to destroy
government and to degrade religion. The history of governmentally established religion, both in
England and in this country, showed that whenever government had allied itself with one
particular form of religion, the inevitable result had been that it had incurred the hatred,
disrespect and even contempt of those who held contrary beliefs."); Ill. ex rei. McCollum v. Bd. of
Educ. ofSch. Dist. No. 71, Champaign Cnty., Ill., 333 U.S. 203, 209-10 (1948) (using the "belief
or unbelief" language, but holding that the government cannot utilize "the tax-established and
tax-supported public school system to aid religious groups to spread their faith" because it is
unconstitutional to favor sectarian religions).
120. For example, the mandates of the Establishment Clause-that the "government must
'neither engage in nor compel religious practices,' that it must 'effect no favoritism among sects
or between religion and nonreligion,' and that it must 'work deterrence of no religious belief'"can all be achieved with a neutrality mandate only as between religion and religion.
See
Van
Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 698-99 (2005) (Breyer,]., concurring) (citations omitted); see also
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 597 (1992) ("[The Court] do[es] not hold that every state action
implicating religion is invalid if one or a few citizens find it offensive. People may take offense at
all manner of religious as well as nonreligious messages, but offense alone does not in every case
show a violation."); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 638-39 (1978) (Brennan,]., concurring)
("[W]e have rejected as unfaithful to our constitutionally protected tradition of religious liberty,
any conception of the Religion Clauses as stating a 'strict no-aid' theory . . . . Such rigid
conceptions of neutrality have been tempered by constructions upholding religious
classifications where necessary to avoid '[a] manifestation of . . . hostility [toward religion] at
war with our national tradition as embodied in the First Amendment's guaranty of the free
exercise ofreligion.'" (citations omitted)).
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Establishment Clause does not compel the government to purge
from the public sphere all that in any way partakes of the religious"
because "[s]uch absolutism is not only inconsistent with our
national traditions, but would also tend to promote the kind of social
conflict the Establishment Clause seeks to avoid." 121
Additionally, the Court has stated that one of the major reasons
as to why it has not adopted a single, bright-line rule to
Establishment Clause cases is to avoid "mechanically invalidating all
governmental conduct or statutes that confer benefits or give special
recognition to religion in general." 122 This policy underlying all
Establishment Clause jurisprudence implies that the Court would
not invalidate government speech regarding religion in general, so
long as the particular speech was not establishing an "orthodox" or
"correct" religion by applying to only specific sects or religions.
These cases show that even though the Court continues to quote
the absolute neutrality language on the face of their opinions, it does
not actually apply this as a rule to decide cases. Even when the Court
uses this language, it simultaneously hints at an opposite policy:
government can endorse religion in general; the only real
Establishment Clause neutrality mandate is as between "religion and
religion."

B. Moving Forward: Government Speech and Religion in General
The Court is not the only entity to recognize the change that the
government speech doctrine has brought to the table of
Establishment Clause issues. Commentators are collectively
optimistic, concerned, and downright confused about the
intermingled future of these two doctrines. This section illustrates
the general perception among scholars about doctrinal development
in this area, possible approaches to reconcile these two bodies of
law, and major concerns that will likely arise with the growth of the
government speech doctrine.

121. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 699 (Breyer,]., concurring) (citations omitted).
122. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984). The Court in Lynch further stated that in
order to avoid mechanical invalidation of all religious traces in public contexts, "the Court has
scrutinized challenged legislation or official conduct to determine whether, in reality, it
establishes a religion or religious faith, or tends to do so." Id.
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1. Proposed approaches to establishment clause neutrality and government
speech doctrine
One approach as to how the two doctrines should be handled
argues that "the Establishment Clause should not be interpreted to
prohibit 'non preferential' establishments of religion." 123 Any
approach that uses more restrictive neutrality "ignores the
historically close relationship between church and state, overlooks
the tradition of governmental endorsement of generic religion, and
reads too much significance into Jefferson's 'misleading metaphor'
regarding the wall of separation between church and state." 124
Scholars have recognized the potential for particular Justices on the
Court to adopt this view regarding government speech directed at
religion in general. 125 But there is certainly still a lively debate
among courts and commentators over the question of whether the
"government may endorse religion in general as against nonreligion." 126
Further, even prior to the recent government speech cases, some
scholars saw through the Court's "nonreligion" dicta, and began to
hypothesize that neutrality was not required regarding religion in
general. 127 This recognition will continue to grow as the government

123. Steven G. Gey, Reconciling the Supreme Court's Four Establishment Clauses, 8 U. PA. j.
CONST. L. 725, 754 (2006) (citing Wallace v. jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91 (1985) (Rehnquist,].,
dissenting)); see also Robert L. Cord, Church-State Separation: Restoring the "No Preference" Doctrine of
the First Amendment, 9 HARV. j .L. & PUB. POL'Y 129 (1986).
124. Gey, supra note 123, at 754 (citations omitted).
125. See james A. Campbell, Newdow Calls for A New Day in Establishment Clause jurisprudence:
justice Thomas's "Actual Legal Coercion" Standard Provides the Necessary Renovation, 39 AKRON L. REV.
541, 569 n. 185 (2006) (" Uustice] Thomas seems to leave open the question of whether support
for religion generally through taxation violates the Establishment Clause. There is an argument
that the Founders would have found no Establishment Clause violation if the government taxes
its citizens to support religion in general, as long as the government does not prefer one religion
over another when distributing the funds." (citations omitted)); Gey, supra note 123, at 754
(discussing justices Roberts's and Rehnquist's positive views concerning the absence of a
neutrality mandate between religion and nonreligion).
126. Michael C. Dorf, Same-Sex Marriage, Second-Class Citizenship, and Law's Social Meanings,
97 VA. L. REV. 1267, 1287 (2011).
127. Dhananjai Shivakumar, Neutrality and the Religion Clauses, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
505, 530 (1998) ("Given the extreme diversity of religions, benefits flowing to religion in
general do not endorse a particular metaphysical view as true, and therefore do not threaten the
same kind of deep alienation worthy of special constitutional solicitude."). But see Douglas
Laycock, The Underlying Unity of Separation and Neutrality, 46 EMORY L.J. 43, 72 (1997) (arguing
that even under the government speech doctrine, the "government should neither praise nor
condemn religion in general or any religion in particular").
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speech doctrine develops over time. 128 As a result of this expanded
government speech doctrine and its effect on religion, post-Summum
scholars have also cautioned that the "Court's expansion of
'government speech' as a Free Speech Clause defense should
heighten the Court's scrutiny of government's religious speech." 129
Also, some have taken the view that with the new government
speech doctrine, the Court's holding in Marsh v. Chambers 130-that
the Nebraska Legislature's chaplaincy practice does not violate the
Establishment Clause for historical and originalism reasons-is no
longer an exception. 131 Accordingly, "the government is also free to
adopt other 'policies of accommodation, acknowledgment, and
support for religion' that are 'deeply embedded in the history and
tradition of this country' without violating the Establishment
Clause." 132 This also supports the idea represented in this Comment
that the government speech doctrine could allow for government
speech regarding religion in general.
Finally, some scholars have moved forward with little or no eye
for the government speech doctrine at all. These scholars contend
that there are still adequate Establishment Clause approaches to take

128. Steven D. Smith, The Establishment Clause and the "Problem of the Church," in CHALLENGES
TO RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 13-14 (Gerard V. Bradley ed., 2012)
(Univ. of San Diego Sch. of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 09024, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 1444606 (arguing
that because government speech has historically acknowledged God and endorsed religion in
general, the government can act favorably with respect to religion in general, so long as it does
not do so with specific religious sects). But see Patrick M. Garry, Pleasant Grove City v.
Summum: The Supreme Court Finds a Public Display of the Ten Commandments to Be Permissible
Government Speech, 2009 CATO Sur. CT. REV. 271, 292 ("The Summum Court arguably used the
government speech doctrine to sanction treating different religions differently. And if the
government is allowed to engage in such religious discrimination when it comes to monuments,
it could cause a backlash against future governmental acknowledgment or support of religion in
general.").
129. Dolan, Government Identity Speech and Religion: Establishment Clause Limits After Summum,
supra note 7, at 4; see also Licensing Facially Religious Government Speech, supra note 10, at 322
(agreeing that Summum expanded the government speech doctrine and determining that the
central question moving forward is "whether the government has a primarily religious purpose,"
which means the specialty license plates implicating a religious message-the major focus of this
article-are likely to be deemed constitutional "under both the Free Speech and Establishment
Clauses of the First Amendment").
130. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
131. When the Exception Becomes the Rule, supra note 10, at I 075.
132. Id. But see Lund, supra note 1, at 980 (concluding that although legislative
nonsectarian prayer is deeply rooted in our country's history, the cost of maintaining it is too
high as it causes many hidden "perils of apparently benign religious endorsements").
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care of the difficult cases that fall in the cracks between
Establishment Clause neutrality and the government speech
doctrine, such as the reasonable observer approach. 133 This test, for
instance, "would ask 'whether a reasonable and fully informed
observer would understand the expression to be government speech,
as distinct from private speech the government chooses to oblige by
allowing the monument to be placed on public land."' 134
2. Major remaining concerns post-Summum
Justices and scholars alike have recognized concerns with these
two doctrines moving forward. The primary concern, acknowledged
by Justice Alito in his majority opinion in Summum, is "that the
government speech doctrine not be used as a subterfuge for favoring
certain private speakers over others based on viewpoint." 135 Many
scholars agree that this favoritism concern is a real, potential
threat. 136 Specifically, an overarching concern related to
governmental favoritism is the worry that the government will favor
the majority religion over the many minority religions because of the
ease of doing so, 137 and this would be at the expense of many
Americans who belong to these minorities and choose to live in this
country because of the religious rights guaranteed in the First
Amendment. Several scholars have even illustrated hypothetical
situations to illustrate the significance of this concern. 138
133. james Bernstein, Pleasant Grove City v. Summum: How Establishment Clause Principles
Help Define the Government Speech Doctrine, 88 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 73, 94 (2010).
134. Id. (arguing that this test "would provide coherence with Establishment Clause law"
because "it recognizes that there are at least some monuments on public land that display
religious symbolism and clearly do not express a government's chosen view").
135. Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 473 (2009).
136. See Knicely & Whitehead, supra note 10, at 903; Goldberg, supra note 44, at 43
("There is no better argument for the danger of a government-speech doctrine than a judge's
failure to see that allowing one religion's privately contributed monument in a public park, but
denying another religion's privately contributed monument, does not present a situation in
which a government entity is providing a forum for private speech."); Cambron-McCabe, supra
note 7 (recognizing the problem that some justices foresaw with the government speech
doctrine: favoritism of certain religions over others).
137. Frederick Mark Gedicks, Undoing Neutrality? From Church-State Separation to judeaChristian Tolerance, 46 WILLAMEITE L. REV. 691, 702-03 (2010) (warning that the government
speech doctrine has the potential to allow the government to favor religious preferences of the
majority viewpoint); see also Bernstein, supra note 133, at 92-93.
138. E.g., Stephen M. Feldman, Conservative Eras in Supreme Court Decision-Making:
Employment Division v. Smith, judicial Restraint, and Neoconservatism, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1791,
1810 (2011) ("That is, if (in some science fiction world) a city already had long displayed a
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While the favoritism of the more popular religions is an
important concern, this problem would not surface if the
Establishment Clause mandated neutrality only as between religious
sects. Of course, it would be unconstitutional to use the government
speech doctrine as a sword to promote certain religions at the
expense of other minority religions, and as Justice Alita recognized
in Summum, this is an area in which the government should be even
more cautious to ensure it does not overstep those boundaries. 139
But under this Comment's interpretation of the neutrality mandated
by the Establishment Clause, this kind of government speech would
remain unconstitutional. A mandate on nondiscrimination as
between different religions would absolve this concern regarding
government speech, and it would be a more clear and accurate
interpretation of the Establishment Clause. Thus, because the
Establishment Clause mandates neutrality between religious sects,
the government speech doctrine should allow the government to
"speak for itself,r 40 about religion in general, without creating a
problem of government favoritism among majority religions at the
expense of minority beliefs.
V. CONCLUSION

The idea that the Establishment Clause and the government
speech doctrine are two areas of law that are in dire need of clarity is
not novel, but it is certainly accurate. While the Court cannot be
expected to establish a bright line rule for each of these highly
complex, First Amendment doctrines, it can and should present a
clearer depiction of "what the law is" in these areas. 141 One way to
do this is to decide once and for all whether the Establishment
Clause mandates neutrality between religion and nonreligion or
merely neutrality between different religions and religious sects.

Seven Aphorisms monument (or a monument from some other minority religion) and then the
Fraternal Order of Eagles offered to donate a Ten Commandments monument, would the Court
allow the city to reject the Ten Commandments monument because of the government speech
doctrine? Or would the Court conclude that a park was a public forum and that rejecting the Ten
Commandments monument amounted to unconstitutional content or viewpoint
discrimination?").
139. Summum, 555 U.S. at 473.
140. Bd. of Regents ofUniv. ofWis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217,229 (2000).
141. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.").
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When that decision is made, it should be determined that the
Establishment Clause-according to its original foundation and the
intent of the Founding Fathers-does not mandate absolute
neutrality, and furthermore that the government speech doctrine
grants the government authority to speak about nonspecific moral
principles and religion in general, so long as such speech does not
discriminate between religions or religious sects.
Several recent Establishment Clause cases involving government
speech among the several circuit courts have either been denied
certiorari (with no explanations) or dismissed on standing grounds.
These cases have presented opportunities for more clarity in these
complicated areas of law that the Court has simply denied to take.
Understandably, "[k]eeping within the bounds of our constitutional
authority often comes at a cost" of not being able to rule on a case
when jurisdictional elements are lacking, but when these
jurisdictional issues do not stand in its way, the Court should grant
certiorari whenever possible to provide guidance for the important
questions of law these cases present. 142
The central purpose of this Comment is to urge the Court to
provide more clarity in these areas and, in so doing, to abstain from
stripping the public domain from all traces of religion. The mere idea
that promoting religion in general or principles that are taught in
various religions would offend those who prefer nonreligion is not a
sufficient justification for prohibiting this type of speech under the
Establishment Clause. Nor would the original meaning of the
Establishment Clause prohibit such government speech. This nation
was founded on general religious principles, and the Constitution
that outlines this founding would not silence government
endorsement of its own cornerstones of belief, so long as it concerns
nonspecific, general ideas.

Haley Jankowski*

142. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1828 (2010) ("Federal courts have no warrant to
revisit that decision-and to risk replacing the people's judgment with their own-unless and
until a proper case has been brought before them. This is not it.").
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